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I
Introduction
In a warning to potential skin cancer victims, the American
Academy of Dermatology offers the following humorous
advertisement - Five Ways to Die on the Golf Course: 1. Hit by a golf
ball, 2. Run over by a golf cart, 3. Whacked by a golf club, 4. Struck
by lightning, and 5. Forgot your hat. Obviously, the Academy's intent
is to impress upon golfers the importance of protecting their skin
from the damaging effects of prolonged exposure to the sun. Perhaps
unintentionally, the good doctors also recognize an increasing and
serious danger for golfers - the growing risk of being hit by a golf club
or golf ball while participating in the sport.
There is a perceptible trend in the case law and literature dealing
with the tort liability of golfers who cause injury to other participants.
Although not unanimous in their approach to the problem, courts and
commentators have tended to borrow tort principles applied in other
sports contexts and concluded that ordinary negligence will not
suffice to establish liability for golfers who injure other players during
practice or play. Rather, utilizing the same rules applicable to other
sports, the authorities have generally determined that recklessness
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should be the relevant threshold for liability.'
This article rejects the notion of a "one size fits all" approach to
tort liability for sports participants. A negligence standard would
make little sense for more violent sports like boxing, football or
hockey, but that does not necessarily require the abandonment of
such an approach in all sports contexts. Despite the adoption of a
more stringent threshold for liability in recent opinions, this piece
argues that the history and nature of golf supports a negligence
standard for tort liability when such imprudence is combined with a
violation of the rules and/or customs of the sport.
Unlike many sports where participants are urged to compete
with reckless abandon in order to maximize their performance and
chances for success, golfers do not improve their play in any way by
acting with disregard for the well-being of others. In fact, safety is the
very first issue addressed in the Official Rules of Golf. Section 1 of
the United States Golf Association rules pertains to etiquette and
expressly provides that "[pirior to playing a stroke or making a
practice swing, the player should ensure that no one is standing close
by or in a position to be hit by the club, the ball or any stones,
pebbles, twigs or the like which may be moved by the stroke or
swing."2 The rules further note that "[n]o player should play until the
players in front are out of range."3 Commentary on the nature and
customs of golf also emphasizes the importance of safety as part of
the sport.
Unlike many sports that involve constant collisions, or even less
frequent contact with other players, the best golfers in the world can
perform at peak efficiency without ignoring these cautionary rules.
Given the significant expansion of public golf facilities to
1. See infra text accompanying notes 7-79. This article focuses exclusively on the
issue of tort liability for injuries sustained by golfers at the hands of other participants.
Issues such as the liability of golf course operators or owners are not covered. For a
discussion of that topic, see e.g. Michael Flynn, The Sign Said "Beware of Duffers" - The
Liability of Golf Course Operators For Failing to Post Warning Signs, 12 Seton Hall J.

Sport L. 1 (2002); John J. Kircher, Golf and Torts: An Interesting Twosome, 12 Marq.
Sports L. Rev. 347, 353-60 (2001).
2. The Rules of Golf and the Rules of Amateur Status, Section 1 (2002-2003).
3. Id.
4. See e.g. Gary McCord, Golf for Dummies 269-70 (2d ed. 1999) (humorously
noting that lawyers love golfers who ignore the basic rule of thumb to wait for players in
front to get well out of range before hitting); M. Scott Peck, Golf and the Spirit. Lessons
For the Journey 185 (1999) (noting the speed at which a golf ball travels and the fact that it
is "very hard" as safety rationale for the "order of [the] dance down the fairway); Golf
Magazine's Encyclopedia of Golf 443-44 (2d ed. 1993) (warning against hitting when
others are in range or a shot is blind and also cautioning against throwing clubs).
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accommodate the growth of interest in the sport,5 it is particularly
important to address safety concerns because a greater risk of injury
accompanies increased participation. Despite the fact that golf has

emerged from the private clubs in the United States and become a
game that transcends -traditional socio-economic barriers, proper
etiquette should remain a central feature of the sport and contribute
to safe play.6

II
The Developing Case Law
It is apparent that courts in the majority of recent cases dealing
with injuries inflicted on golfers by other players have declined to
apply a negligence standard and opted for the more stringent
requirement of recklessness. In Thompson v. McNeill, the Ohio
Supreme Court rejected a lower appellate court's attempt to

distinguish golf from more active sports and applied the recklessness
standard. More specifically, in Thompson, a golfer was hurt when
another player shanked a shot and inflicted a severe eye injury. The

court framed the issue as "the degree of care owed between
participants in a sport, in this instance the game of golf."" It succinctly

held that "between participants in such sporting events, only injuries
caused by intentional 'conduct, or in some instances reckless

5. See e.g., Terry Golway, We Played on These Greens Long Before P.G.A. Game;
Kramden Addressed the Ball, N.Y. Observer 1 (June 17, 2002) (noting that 26 million
people play golf in the U.S. with 80% playing public courses); This Country Needs Public
Golf Courses, Africa News (June 15, 2002) (stating that the U.S. has over 11,000 public
courses and 4,315 private ones while in 1930 the U.S. had about 1,000 public courses and
4,448 private ones). See also Mark Herrmann, U.S. Open Preview; Golf on Long Island;
Fore:, Newsday K02 (May 19, 2002) (documenting growth of public golf on Long Island);
Randall Mell, The Most-Often Open: You, Too, Can Play Bethpage, Major's First
Municipal Course Host, Sun-Sentinel 10C (June 10, 2002) (noting that the five public
courses at Bethpage State Park in New York host more than 300,000 rounds per year); Art
Popham, Tacoma Wash.-Area Golf Clubs Struggle to Keep Membership Up. News Tribune
(June 11, 2002) (finding that private golf clubs face problems beyond proliferation of
courses, including sociological and societal changes).
6. Compare John O'Sullivan, The People's Country Club, Irish Times 55 (June 11,
2002) (explaining that at Bethpage "[g]olfers can play in jeans, T-shirts, tank tops, have
long hair or no hair, wear earrings or nose studs) with Mitchell Platts, The Illustrated
History of Golf 8 (Gramercy 2000) (concluding that golf is "the most honourable of
games ... played in a gentlemanly fashion... stand[ing] apart from those sports which
rear temperamental followers and rivals."); See also Douglas Erskine, Instructions in
Etiquette in The Little Treasury of Golf 11-16 (J. P. Resnick ed. 1996) (commenting on the
importance of golfing etiquette).
7. 559 N.E.2d 705 (Ohio 1990).
8. Id. at 706.

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[24:317

misconduct, may give rise to a cause of action."9 Although the court
acknowledged the "dearth of Ohio case law" on the issue, ' it
nevertheless chose to adopt the same tort principle applicable to
more active and even violent sports activities. The rationale offered
for this approach was that there is a need for a "special rule for tort
liability" in sports because "playing fields, golf courses and boxing
rings are places in which behavior that would give rise to tort liability
under ordinary circumstances is accepted and indeed encouraged.""
Noting that the risk of inadvertent harm is often "built into the
sport,"'2 the court somewhat cryptically explained that acts giving rise
to tort liability on a street or backyard would not be considered
negligent at all in the context of a sport where similar conduct was
The court
foreseeable and within the rules of the game. 3
competition
should
acknowledged that the need to allow vigorous
preclude the application of tort principles in a manner that could
"stifle the rewards of athletic competition."" At the same time, the

court refused to declare a playing field a "freefire zone," and
explained that what constitutes reckless as opposed to merely
negligent behavior must be determined in the context of the rules of a
particular sport.'5
The Thompson court clearly stated that "an athlete who
intentionally injures a [co-participant] in a way not authorized or
anticipated by the customs and rules of the game violates the duty not
to commit an intentional tort.""' It also recognized a "more subtle
difficulty" regarding the "intermediate" recklessness standard, but
concluded that "under some circumstances" recklessness would
suffice for tort liability in a sports setting.'7 The court conceded that it
9. Id. The court clearly stated that "[tihere is no liability for injuries caused by
negligent conduct."
10. Id.
11. Id. at 707. Interestingly, the court also found it "paradoxical" that athletes are
nevertheless expected to obey the rules of their sports.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. The court explained that a failure to warn another golfer with a call of "fore"
when the other player is within the line of flight of a shot could actually constitute
"reckless indifference."
16. Id.
17. Id. at 707-08. The court relied on the definition of recklessness provided by § 500
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 587 (1965), which distinguishes recklessness
from both negligence and intentional misconduct. Recklessness is more culpable than
mere negligence because it involves conduct under circumstances where the actor knows
or has reason to know that his or her conduct creates an unreasonable risk of harm to
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could not "provide a single list of actions that will give rise to tort
liability for recklessness or intentional misconduct in every sport."' 8
Rather, the rules and customs of the sport had to be consulted to
determine the proper characterization of the alleged tortfeasor's
conduct.'9 Thus, the court concluded that:

[a]nalyzing liability for injuries inflicted in sports in terms of
a continuum along which the standard of care rises as the
inherent danger of the sport falls is more useful than
distinguishing sports by applying a black-and-white
distinction between contact and non-contact sports.0
Applying these principles to the facts in Thompson, the Ohio

Supreme Court determined that summary judgment for defendant
was appropriate because the shanking, hooking, slicing or pulling of a

golf ball is both foreseeable and "not uncommon."2 ' The offending
shot was within the rules and not reckless.22

The Texas courts have also rejected negligence as a sufficient
predicate for golfers' tort liability to co-participants. In Hathaway v.
Tascosa Country Club, Inc.,23 a player was hit in the eye by a stray

shot while he rode in a golf cart. The golfer causing the injury yelled
another and such risk is substantially greater that that which is necessary to make the
action merely negligent. On the other hand, the tortfeasor does not intend the resulting
harm caused by his or her conduct.
18. Id. at 708.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 709. The court pointed out that golf does involve a risk of coming into
contact with balls flying off the intended line of flight.
21. Id. Interestingly, the court added that even if it had adopted a negligence
standard, no liability would attach because the plaintiff was outside the "zone of danger"
and the shot was a "freak shot." Id. at 709 n. 2
22. Id. at 709. (A number of subsequent Ohio cases have followed Thompson v.
McNeill and applied the recklessness standard to tort claims resulting from golfing
injuries. See e.g. Maxwell v. Rowe, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4396 (Ohio Ct. App. Sep. 23,
1998) (reversing summary judgment for defendant because material fact issue remained
regarding recklessness); Dinnin v. Bencin, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 3502 (Ohio Ct. App.
July 30, 1998) (affirming summary judgment for defendant in absence of any plausible
recklessness claim); Ickes v. Tille, 10 Ohio App. 3d 438, 441-42 (Ohio App. 1996) (applying
recklessness standard and affirming summary judgment for defendant); Biggin v. Stark,
1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 3747 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 26,1994) (affirming summary judgment
for defendant when club slipped out of his hand during practice swing because it was not
reckless); Zimmerman v. Kalu Canfield Driving Range, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 2957
(Ohio Ct. App. June 10, 1993) (applying recklessness standard to driving range accident);
Baker v. Groetz, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 5746 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 9, 1992) (applying
recklessness to "putt-putt" golf).
23. 846 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. App. 1993).
24. Id. at 615. The plaintiff suffered permanent vision loss in his left eye as a result of
the injury.
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"fore," but the plaintiff was unable to avoid the errant shot - a badly
hooked practice stroke from the driving range. 25 The plaintiff alleged
negligence on the part of the other golfer and the course operator; the
court affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the individual
defendant, but reversed summary judgment for the country club.26
The Court of Appeals specifically held that "for a plaintiff to
prevail.., against a fellow golfer, the defendant must have acted
recklessly or intentionally, 2 7 and there was simply no evidence that
the defendant had hit a ball from the driving range onto the course
either intentionally or recklessly. 2 1 The court relied on the Ohio
Supreme Court's decision in Thompson and reasoned that "the risk of
being inadvertently hit by a29 golf ball struck by another competitor is
built into the game of golf.
Similarly, in Allen v. Donath,3 ° another Texas appellate court
rejected the application of a negligence standard to co-participant
injuries in golf. In Allen, plaintiff was hit in the head by a "mulligan"
shot by defendant - a second tee shot that usually follows from an
unsatisfactory first effort by a golfer.3 On appeal, plaintiff contested
the trial court's refusal, to instruct the jury on a negligence standard
rather than recklessness as the threshold for tort liability. Refusing to
apply a negligence standard, the court rejected a distinction between
contact and non-contact sports as a line of demarcation to determine
when negligence might suffice to support a tort claim."
Instead,
despite conceding that the "genteel game of golf can hardly be
described as a 'competitive contact sport,"' the court borrowed from
a Texas case involving polo and determined that "the reckless and
intentional standard is every bit as appropriate to conduct on the
links as it is to conduct on the polo field."33
25. Id.
26. Id. at 617-18. The negligence claim against the course operator and the general
question of tort liability for alleged defective conditions on golf courses is beyond the
scope of this article. This piece is concerned solely with the issue of co-participant
liability. See supra note 1 for authorities addressing golf course operator and owner
liability.
27. Id. at 617.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 616.
30. 875 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. App. 1994).
31. Id. at 439. It was disputed whether the defendant announced his intention to hit
the "mulligan."
32. Id. at 439-40.
33. Id. at 440 (citing Connell v. Payne, 814 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. App. 1991)). (The Allen
court also relied on the Ohio decision in Thompson and Hathaway v. Tascosa Country
Club, Inc. 846 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Tex. App. 1993).
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34 a golfer was blinded by a coMore recently, in Monk v. Phillips,
participant's shanked shot but nevertheless was unable to recover, as
the court affirmed summary judgment for the golfer causing the
severe injury because of the absence of recklessness or intentional
misconduct.35 The court concluded that "[w]e agree with our sister
courts of appeals that the recklessness or intentional standard is the
correct standard of care applicable to a cause of action against a
fellow golfer."36 The court's review of the record led it to conclude
that the offending stroke might "qualify as incompetence or
unskillfulness," but it did not rise to the level of recklessness.37 A
shanked shot was simply a "foreseeable and not uncommon
occurrence in the game of golf.""
The precise rationale of these cases is somewhat unclear. If the
courts mean to say that it is not careless or negligent merely to hit bad
shots in golf, that is unobjectionable. However, it is not clear why this
problem cannot be properly addressed by a standard of ordinary care.
Analogizing to sports like polo, where players are moving at a high
rate of speed on horseback and wielding mallets to strike a ball
toward a goal while opposing players attempt to defend, seems to
ignore fundamental distinctions about how different sports are
played. More specifically, despite certain inherent risks in golf, it is
still unclear why holding players to a negligence standard would alter
the fundamental nature of the sport or deter or chill enthusiastic
participation.
In a more recent case, Gray v. Giroux,9 a Massachusetts
appellate court also applied the recklessness standard to golf;
summary judgment for the defendant was affirmed where plaintiff
alleged that she was negligently hit in the head by a golf ball struck by
the defendant. The facts indicated that the plaintiff was trying to help
her husband find a lost ball near the edge of the fairway when
defendant hit a shot without warning and caused her injury."
Although the court recognized that "golf differs from hockey,""1
it nevertheless borrowed from an earlier Massachusetts decision
involving co-participants in a hockey game and concluded that a

34.
35.
36.
37.

983 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. App. 1998).
Id. at 326.
Id. at 325.
Id.

38.
39.

Id.
730 N.E.2d 338 (Mass. App. 2000).

40. Id. at 340.
41.

Id.
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recklessness standard applied in both contact and non-contact sports
to support "the promotion of vigorous participation in athletic
activities" and prevent a "flood of litigation" that might result from a
negligence standard." The facts of Gray did not provide any basis for
finding the defendant reckless, because the plaintiff was not in the
intended path of defendant's shot and the defendant had not even
seen the plaintiff prior to playing his stroke.43
Interestingly, the decision in Gray was not in accord with some
earlier Massachusetts precedent. In Orth v. Novelli," one judge
denied defendant's motion to summarily dismiss a negligence claim
brought by another golfer struck by defendant's driver after it either
slipped or was thrown from his hand. Although the court recognized
that Massachusetts had adopted a recklessness standard for coparticipant liability in contact sports such as hockey,45 and that other
lower Massachusetts courts had applied that standard to golf,46 it
nevertheless declined to follow that approach.
Instead, the court chose to adopt a negligence standard because
"[g]olf is not the type of game in which participants are inherently,
inevitably or customarily struck by either the ball or another players'
club."47 Further, the court noted that "[u]nlike contact sports, where
assaults and batteries are the norm, the only time golfers normally
touch each other is when they shake hands at the end of a round. 48
The emphasis in golf is "on control, finesse and courteous behavior
rather than power, speed and violent contact."" Thus, given what it
perceived as a fundamental difference between golf and sports like
hockey, the court rejected the notion that a lower threshold for
liability would somehow "chill participation" in golf."' Clearly,
42. Id. (relying on Gauvin v. Clark, 537 N.E.2d 94, 97 (Mass. 1989)).
43. Gray, 730 N.E.2d at 341.
44. 1997 Mass. Super. LEXIS 119 (Mass. Super Ct. Nov. 21, 1997).
45. Id. at **2-3.
46. Id. at *3 (citing Mangone v. Pickering, 1997 Mass. Super. LEXIS 474 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 1997); Campbell v. Picceri,1996 Mass. Super. LEXIS 474 (Mass. Super.
Ct.,June 28, 1996); Hill v. Bosma, 1993 Mass. App. Div. 128 (1993)).
47. Id. at *5.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at *6. The Orth court also relied on a New York decision, Neumann v.
Shlansky, 294 N.Y.S.2d 628, 630 (N.Y.Co.Ct. 1968), to support a negligence standard.
Interestingly, although one commentator agrees that New York takes a reasonable care
approach to golf tort cases, see Robert D. Lang, Lawsuits on the Links: Golfers Must
Exercise Ordinary Care to Avoid Slices, Shanks and Hooks, N.Y. St. Bar J. 10 (July/August
2000), more recent New York decisions appear to reject that approach. See Havens v.
Kling, 715 N.Y.S.2d 812, 813 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (applying primary assumption of risk
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however, Orth reflects a decidedly minority view in recent litigation
within and outside Massachusetts.
Perhaps the most comprehensive endorsement of a recklessness
standard for golf tort cases may be attributed to Schick v. Ferolito,"'a
case recently decided in the backyard of the United States Golf
Association. In Schick, the Supreme Court of New Jersey squarely
rejected the negligence standard for golf torts endorsed by the lower
appellate court. 2 The facts in Schick were rather straightforward: an
errant tee shot by one player struck the plaintiff in the eye.53 It was
alleged that this occurred when the defendant allegedly hit an
unexpected second tee shot or "mulligan."54
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that it had adopted a
recklessness standard for a tort claim arising during an informal
softball game,55 and it explained that a recklessness approach in sports
"is founded on more than a concern for a court's ability to discern
adequately what constitutes reasonable conduct under the highly
varied circumstances of informal sports activity. 5 6 This "heightened
standard" would limit liability to "clearly unreasonable" behavior and
insulate conduct that is inherent in sports and part of the game. 7
Thus, the recklessness standard "recognizes a commonsense
distinction between excessively harmful conduct and the more routine
rough-and-tumble of sports that should occur freely on the playing
fields and should not be second-guessed in courtrooms."58 The court

to bar claim when plaintiff hit in head by practice swing of other minor golfer); Griffin v.
Lardo, 668 N.Y.S.2d 837 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (also following assumption of risk). For a
more recent decision applying primary assumption of risk to a golfer injury claim, see
Gyuriak v. Millice, 775 N.E.2d 391, 395-96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant golfer under Indiana law).
51. 767 A.2d 962 (N.J. 2001).
52. Id. at 963, 965. The intermediate appellate court had opined that "New Jersey has
long held golfers to the ordinary negligence standard, that is, a golfer hitting a golf ball has
a duty to use reasonable care before executing a swing, to first observe whether there is
anybody else in the line of fire, and if so, to provide an adequate warning." Schick v.
Ferolito, 744 A.2d 219, 221 (N..J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000), affd as modified, 767 A.2d
962 (2001), citing Toohey v. Webster, 97 N.J.L. 545, 547, 117 A. 838 (E.& A. 1922);
Carrigan v. Roussell, 177 N.J. Super. 272, 275-76, 426 A.2d 517 (App. Div. 1981). The
lower court also noted that negligence "has been the general rule elsewhere." Id.
53. Schick, 767 A.2d at 963.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 965 (citing Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600 (N.J. 1994)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. Noting that a number of jurisdictions had adopted a recklessness standard for
"recreational players," the court cited this author's work for the proposition that there is a
"modern trend" towards that heightened liability threshold. Id., citing Daniel E.Lazaroff,
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then noted that courts in other jurisdictions had specifically adopted
recklessness as the appropriate standard for golf, 9 and explained that
some commentators supported that approach as well."
The court explained that the "policies of promoting vigorous
participation in recreational sports and the avoidance of a flood of
litigation over sports accidents are furthered by the application of the
heightened standard of care to all recreational sports."' The court
determined that the distinction between "contact" and "noncontact"
sports was unpersuasive and "artificial."62 It concluded that the
attempted distinction was "contrary to the common sense notion that
risk of injury is a 'common and inherent aspect', of athletic effort
generally. ' 63
The court argued that the "contact-non-contact
distinction does not sufficiently take into account that we are dealing
with a spectrum of duties and risks rather than an either-or
distinction." ' In answering the question of whether golf is a contact
sport, the court opined that a golfer. obviously "accepts the risks of
coming in contact with wayward golf shots on the links, so golf is
more dangerous than table tennis... but certainly not as dangerous
Torts and Sports: Participant Liability to Co-Participantsfor Injuries Sustained During
Competition, 7 U. Miami Ent. & Sports L. Rev. 191, 195, 198 (1990). Although this
observation is applicable to active and contact sports, it is important to note that the cited
article also explained that "there are some sports, such as golf .... in which a participant
does not anticipate suffering injury at the hand of a competitor. If injuries do occur, a
recklessness standard may be too high a threshold for tort liability." Id. at 214.
59. Schick, 767 A.2d at 966. It is interesting to note that the court relied in part on
Dilger v. Moyles, 63 Cal. Rptr. 591, 593 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) for a recklessness standard in
golf cases. However, the leading California sports tort case, Knight v. Jewett, while
applying the recklessness standard to touch football, also specifically noted that "we have
no occasion to decide whether a comparable limited duty of care should be applied to
other less active sports, such as archery or golf." 3 Cal. 4th 296, 320, n. 7 (1992).
60. Schick, 767 A.2d at 967, citing Brendon D. Miller, Hoke v. Cullinan: Recklessness
as the Standard for RecreationalSports Injuries. 23 Ky. L.J. 409, 434 (1996); Mel Narol,
Sports Participationwith Limited Litigation: The Emerging Reckless DisregardStandard, 1
Seton Hall J. Sport L. 29 (1991); Frank J. Deangelis, Note, Duty of Care Applicable to
Participantsin Informal Recreational Sports to Avoid the Infliction of Injury Caused by
Reckless or Intentional Conduct, 5 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 509 (1995) for a general
recklessness standard in sports tort cases and Melissa Cohen, Note, Co-Participantsin
Recreational Activities Owe Each Other a Duty not to Act Recklessly, 10 Seton Hall J.
Sport L. 187 (2000); Karen M. Viera, Comment, "Fore!" May Just be Parfor the Course, 4
Seton Hall J. Sport L. 181 (1994) to support the recklessness standard for golf. For a
recent discussion of the emerging standard, see Kircher, supra n.1, at 348-53 and Carla N.
Palumbo, New Jersey Joins the Majority of Jurisdictions in Holding Recreational Sports
Co-Participantsto a Reckless Standardof Care, 12 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 227 (2002).
61. Schick, 767 A.2d at 968.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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as kickboxing. '"" Thus, the Schick court, rejected any "crabbed"
application of the recklessness standard and found that it reflected "a
more modern approach" for recreational injury cases. 6 The court
quickly added that its decision was not intended to turn golf courses
into a "free-fire zone," but recklessness had to be proved to prevail in
litigation.67
In sharp contrast to the trend reflected in cases like Schick, one
Illinois appellate court has firmly rejected the recklessness standard.
In Zurla v. Hydel,6s the court affirmed the denial of summary
judgment for defendant after plaintiff alleged negligent infliction of
injury resulting from defendant's shot towards the green.69 The court
acknowledged that this was a case of first impression in Illinois and
noted that defendant and plaintiff clearly disagreed on the
appropriate standard of care.7" While plaintiff contended that "the
proper standard of care should be the same... as in any ordinary
negligence case," defendant argued that "an allegation of simple
negligence should be insufficient.., in cases involving golf ball
injuries because ... public policy ... is to promote athletic endeavors
such as golf."'"
Although Illinois had applied a higher liability threshold in an
earlier soccer case," the court expressly rejected any heightened
requirement in the context of golf. The court noted that Illinois
recognizes a distinction between contact and non-contact sports, and
that a critical question is whether "physical -contact in a particular
athletic endeavor is 'inevitable" and whether participants in such
events can therefore fairly expect contact."73 Expressly rejecting the
Ohio Supreme Court's approach in Thompson, the Zurla court
explained that "[the simple fact that] there is an inherent risk that

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 968-70. The court recognized that recklessness is an "extreme departure
from ordinary care," and that unlike mere negligence, it requires a "conscious choice of a
course of action, with knowledge or reason to know that it will create a serious danger to
others." Id. at 969. The court in Schick, over a partial dissent, did allow the case to proceed
to trial on a recklessness theory. Id. at 970.
68. 681 N.E.2d 148 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997).
69. Id. at 148-49.
70. Id. at 149.
71. Id. The defendant argued that "wilful and wanton misconduct" should be
required.
72. Id. at 149-50 (citing Nabozny v. Barnhill,334 N.E.2d 258 (Il. App. 1975)).
73. Id. at 150. This is an objective standard based on the factors surrounding the
sport.
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players may accidentally touch one another is not particularly
relevant to the 'contact sport' inquiry."74 The elevated recklessness
standard only applies where "the participants were engaged in an
activity in which physical contact with one another, or with some
physical component of the game, is part and parcel of the sport."75
Thus:

[t]he decision to apply an elevated standard, excusing
ordinary negligence, is not only supported by the fact
that the parties are aware of the inherent dangers of
injury, but also because the competitive nature of
contact sports leads the participants to be more

physically aggressive and less careful than they
otherwise would be.76

In the Zurla court's view, golf "is simply not the type of game in
which participants are inherently, inevitably or customarily struck by
the ball."77 Rather, when played in a manner consistent with the rules
and customs of the sport, relying on "control and finesse" instead of
"speed or raw strength," physical dangers are diminished and players

may guard against injury to others without changing the nature of the
game.7" The court therefore concluded that negligence is the
appropriate standard of care, and that golfers must exercise
reasonable care for co-participants within the "range of danger."79

However, Zurla, and other cases following a negligence approach, are
clearly being outnumbered by the rising tide of decisions requiring at
least recklessness on the part of the offending golfer.

74. Id. at 152.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing Everett v. Goodwin, 161 S.E. 316 (N.C. 1931); Alexander v. Wrenn, 164
S.E. 715 (Va. 1932).) Cf Hennessey v. Pyne, 694 A.2d 691, 696-700 (R.I. 1997) (discussing
negligence standard where stray golf shot hit non-participant condominium owner on
adjacent property). For other cases endorsing a negligence standard in the golf context,
see, e.g. Cook v. Johnston, 688 P.2d 215 (Ariz Ct. App. 1984); Duke's GMC, Inc. v.
Erskine, 447 N.E.2d 1118 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Cavin v. Kasser, 820 S.W.2d 647 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1991). See generally Donna M. Skelcy, Liability for Errant Golf Ball Shots, 31 Am
Jur Proof of Facts 3d 87 (1995); Boyd J. Peterson, Annotation, Liability to One Struck by
Golf Club, 63 A.L.R. 4th 221 (1988). See also Ray Yasser, In the Heat of Competition:
Tort Liability of One Participantto Another; Why Can't ParticipantsBe Required to Be
Reasonable?, 5 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 253, 268-70 n.77 (1995) (declining to discuss golf
participant cases but collecting various decisions and opining that "[g]olf, after all, is more
of a game (like chess) than a sport (like football")).
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III

An Alternative Approach
Despite the fact that most contemporary decisions favor the
recklessness approach to sports tort claims even in the golfing
context, it seems that the rationales offered to support this higher
liability threshold are not persuasive. The most comprehensive effort
to justify the recklessness standard is reflected in Schick v. Ferolito"
where the Supreme Court of New Jersey suggested that a negligence
approach could chill vigorous sports participation, open a floodgate of
litigation, generate confusion and permit recovery for an allegedly
inherent risk in the sport of golf.8" Although these justifications for
adopting a recklessness standard make perfect sense for more active
sports, they simply are inapplicable to the golf setting. Even if a
contact/non-contact sports distinction may be inadequate to address
for the nature of the activity in some non-contact sports, a complete
rejection of any negligence standard in any sports context is
unnecessary and unwise.
Initially, it should be noted that maintaining consistency among
all sports tort cases may simplify matters, but it does not necessarily
reflect sound public policy. The departure in some sports cases from
the general principle - that people in our society generally owe others
a duty of reasonable care - itself creates an inconsistency between a
well established general rule of tort law and the rules applied in those
sports tort cases. If consistency were an inviolable principle, any
departure from a negligence standard because of alleged exigent
circumstances in the sporting context would be impermissible.
Adopting a recklessness standard for some sports cases
unquestionably makes sense, but the departure from a negligence
standard in those cases is justified by the inherent nature of the
activities involved.
More specifically, it simply makes no sense to expect
"reasonable" behavior in any traditional sense in sports where
consensual and mutual infliction of injury is part of the competition.
Sports such as boxing, kickboxing, full contact karate and the like
come immediately to mind. Similarly, in "collision" sports like
football or ice hockey it would be folly to expect a player to compete
effectively while acting with reasonable care for the safety of an
opponent." Even in activities not usually characterized as collision
80. Schick, 767 A.2d at 962.
81. Id. at 965-70.
82. Interestingly, however, in Lestina v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 28, 33
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sports, incidental contact with potentially dangerous consequences is
frequent. Thus, in soccer, baseball and basketball one could not play
at the highest level if the chilling effect of a negligence standard were
superimposed on the competition. In fact, even in some sports where
there is little or no player-to-player contact, one could imagine that a
negligence standard could present a problem. For example, a tennis
player hitting a wicked overhead smash or driving a ground stroke at
an opponent rushing the net should not be held liable for hitting the
other player with the ball in such circumstances. In track and field,
runners in distance races sometimes jostle for position and this should
not be actionable. Rather, one must focus on the nature of the sport
and determine whether the allegedly actionable conduct is somehow
inherent in the activity. Thus, a contact/non-contact sport distinction
may be too restrictive, but it does not. necessarily follow that
negligence is never the appropriate standard.
It might be preferable to distinguish between "active" and
"passive" sports." The parameters of each category are not
selfdefining, but there are factors that could be utilized to draw a
meaningful line between "active" sports calling for a recklessness
standard and more "passive" activities to which a negligence standard
might apply.
Even if baseball or basketball are properly
characterized as "non-collision" sports, it is evident that those games
cannot be played zealously and effectively if players must take care
not to run into opposing players - or even teammates. It would be silly
to expect a batter to be careful not to hit a ball directly at a fielder
charging for a bunt or for a guard to be careful not to collide with a
defender as he dribbled towards the basket. These actions are
inherent in hard competition.
Golf, however, is a completely different animal. The game is
simply not played the way these other sports are played. The ball is
stationary when hit, as is the player. There are no human defenders
trying to impede an opposing player from a goal or attempting to
(Wis. 1993), a closely divided Wisconsin Supreme Court approved the use of a flexible
negligence standard in the context of an over-30 recreational soccer league. This is a
decidedly minority position in the contemporary American cases dealing with tort claims
in active or contact sports.
83. In Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 320, n. 7 (1992), the California Supreme Court
concluded that "a participant in an active sport breaches a legal duty of care to other
participants - i.e., engages in conduct that properly may subject him or her to financial
liability - only if the participant intentionally injures another player or engages in conduct
that is so reckless as to be totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the
sport." The court expressly declined to decide whether "a comparable limited duty"
should apply to "less active sports" such as golf.
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catch a batted ball. The defense is provided by the golf course itself
through a variety of natural objects - trees, grass, sand and water. The
elements do not commence lawsuits when struck by a club or ball.
The greatest golfer in the world (Tiger Woods, according to most)
may pursue and achieve golfing excellence without any departure
from the standard of reasonable care. Golf has a long history of
etiquette and civility to the point that players call penalties on
themselves even when the offending conduct might have gone
undetected by other players or officials. There can be no serious
argument that waiting to make a stroke until others are out of range
of the club or ball inhibits anything in the inherent nature of the
sport. Further, shouting a warning of "fore" or signaling with a wave
when a shot goes astray is also something that golfers can easily do
without detracting from the competition.84 Attempting to protect
other players within the "zone of danger" would not alter the
competition.85
Thus, the reasoning of cases that adopt a recklessness standard to
avoid chilling vigorous participation in sports should not apply in the
context of golf. The game can be played as effectively as one's skills
allow without any departure from the negligence standard. In fact, it
could be argued that maintaining one's cool and remaining calm
produces a more successful result. Unreasonable behavior is not a
normal part of golf, and chilling negligent behavior would not
fundamentally alter the nature of the sport in any meaningful way.
The concern that the floodgates of litigation will open wide if a
negligence standard is adopted may also be questioned. If golfers
know that they may be held liable for careless behavior, there will be
a greater incentive to behave accordingly. 6 A negligence standard

84.

The term "fore" is derived from the English military expression "ware before." It

was called out by troops firing in lines as a warning to kneel so that those in the rear would
not "blow [the] heads off" soldiers in the front. See David Feldman, Life's Imponderables:
The Answers to Civilization's Most Perplexing Questions 34 (Galahad Books 1999).
85. In Cook v. Johnston, 688 P.2d 215 (Ariz. App. 1984), the Arizona Court of

Appeals reversed a trial court's decision to vacate a jury verdict in favor of a golfer who
had been injured when another player shanked a shot. The court defined the "zone of

danger" as "the area within which ... [a] shot would foreseeably deviate from the
intended line of flight." Id. at 217. Applying a negligence standard, the court noted that
the defendant frequently shanked shots and that there was a question of fact over which
reasonable minds could differ regarding defendant's failure to issue a warning prior to
hitting. Id. The Cook court cited authorities suggesting that the zone of danger might
extend as much as fifty degrees from the intended line of flight. Id. Compare Peck, supra

n.4, at 185 (stating that golfers can shank up to seventy degrees from their intended
target).
86. This could avoid the "moral hazard" problem - a concept usually applied to
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would encourage proper, instruction in the rules and etiquette of golf
from the inception of a player's participation in the sport. This may
be the most efficient way to prevent many golfing injuries in the first
place. Golfers in control of their own actions, who exercise ordinary
care and common sense before hitting the ball, are in the best
position to protect others without adversely affecting the nature of
the sport.
Although some courts conclude that recklessness is the better
standard because it is inevitable that some players will be struck by
errant shots, the fact remains that strict liability is not what is being
proposed here. The mere occurrence of an injury would not, -in itself,
create tort liability. Rather, any plaintiff would have to plead and
prove that the defendant golfer causing the injury acted without
reasonable care. 7 All of the facts and circumstances surrounding a
particular injury would be relevant to whether a reasonably prudent
golfer should have foreseen the result and acted differently. On more
tightly constructed courses, where fairways are close together or tee
boxes are near areas where golfers on other holes are playing or
walking, a warning before hitting may be more appropriate than on
courses where the holes are better shielded from one another. It may
be reasonable to wait a moment before making a swing if others are
close by and will quickly be out of harm's way. On the other hand,

insureds who have "less incentive to take care." Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of
Law §6.1,150 (3d ed. 1986). One commentator explains that in economic analysis, and the
law and policy debate, moral hazard "refers to the tendency for insurance against loss to

reduce incentives to prevent or minimize the cost of loss." Tom Baker, The Genealogy of
Moral Hazard, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 237, 239 (1996). A higher threshold for liability in golf tort
cases in essence provides a kind of insurance against liability for failure to exercise
ordinary care.
87. In jury trials, it will be important for courts to utilize jury instructions that will
make it clear that the occurrence of an injury is not synonymous with actionable

negligence. The trier of fact must determine that the defendant failed to exercise
reasonable care and violated some rule or custom of the sport of golf. See Cal. Jury
Instruct. BAJI 3.10-3.11, 43-45 (2002) (explaining that negligence is "failure to use
ordinary or reasonable care" and is something which a "reasonably prudent person would
not do, or the failure to do something which a reasonably prudent person would do,"

under similar circumstances). BAJI 3.10 expressly notes that "the person whose conduct
we set up as a standard is not the extraordinarily cautious individual, nor the exceptionally
skillful one, but a person of reasonable and ordinary prudence." BAJI 3.11 elaborates by
explaining that "[olne test that is helpful in determining whether a person was negligent is
to ask and answer the question whether or not, if a person of ordinary prudence had been
in the same situation and possessed of the same knowledge, [he or she] would have
foreseen or anticipated that someone might have been injured as a result of [his or her]
action or inaction." Such instructions can make it clear to juries that the mere occurrence
of a golf injury does not mean that the injury was the result of a failure to exercise due
care.
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injuries resulting from unforeseen events, such as a wild bounce from
a ball hitting a cart path or ricocheting off a tree or rock would not
automatically result in liability. Whether the defendant breached the
duty of reasonable care would be a question of fact. In cases not
settled prior to trial, the parties' advocates would present their best
evidence and arguments on the issue and the fact finder would be
required to judge the reasonableness of a defendant's conduct on the
course.
Further, if a golfer/plaintiff had acted unreasonably by crossing
into a fairway without warning or getting too close to a player taking
a swing, the defense of contributory negligence could be raised. In a
comparative fault jurisdiction,88 the culpable conduct of any plaintiff
may significantly reduce or eliminate recovery. Adopting a negligence
approach would not guarantee financial recovery for every injured
golfer, but it would provide a cause of action for those injured by
careless departures from the rules and customs of the game.

IV
Conclusion
It is certainly true that golf has evolved in the United States to a
point where it is not an activity reserved for the rich and privileged to
pursue within the confines of- exclusive private country clubs.
Nevertheless, the widespread popularity of the sport should not
transform its inherently genteel nature and traditions to the point
where golf is virtually indistinguishable from more violent and
dangerous forms of recreation. The humor associated with fictional
golf movies such as Caddyshack and Happy Gilmore should not
encourage crude and dangerous behavior to actually permeate the
sport and alter its emphasis on courtesy, etiquette and safe play.
The fundamental distinction between golf and many other sports
is that golf may be played at the highest level of skill and performance
without any departure from the traditional negligence standard.
Unlike in other sports, where imposing a negligence standard on
participants would fundamentally limit their ability to compete
effectively within the rules of the game, the best golfers in the world
can and do vie for championships while behaving carefully and with
respect for the welfare of other players. There would be no "chilling
effect" on golfers by applying negligence principles. The only
88. The overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions have adopted systems of
comparative fault. See Victor E. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence § 1-1, 2, 4 (3d ed.
Michie 1994).
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behavior that would be "chilled" would be undesirable conduct that is
not inherent in golf and antithetical to its rules, customs and
traditions. Youngsters and others learning the game would be
encouraged to learn proper behavior along with proper swing
techniques, and those who love the game would be able to continue
to play without fearing that the golf course or driving range has
become a shooting gallery with players as the targets.
The occasional accidental injury may occur even when golfers act
with due care, and there should be no strict liability in those
circumstances. However, adherence to a negligence standard would
encourage courteous and safe play, which in turn should reduce the
number of golfing injuries. Golf balls are hard and travel at high
speed. Modern club technology allows even novice players to hit the
ball farther, increasing the potential for co-participant injury. Thus,
there is a strong policy argument for encouraging safe play, especially
when it can be done without affecting the basic way in which the
game is played. A negligence standard can promote a safe golf
environment without detracting at all from the pursuit of excellence
in the sport.

